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Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a novel hardware-assisted security technology
introduced by Intel Corporation. The ambition of Intel SGX is to provide an isolated and
secure execution environment for user-space applications. Even if the BIOS is compromised,
the protected applications remains secure. The isolated execution environment is located in
a special memory region called the enclave.
Promoting and using a novel technology requires a good understanding of it. This thesis
first contains a systematization of knowledge of the hardware-assisted security technologies,
trusted computing and the Intel SGX. What is more, to have the best practice of using Intel
SGX, we must understand its advantages and limitations, especially the performance issue.
This thesis then has a discussion of where the performance overhead of Intel SGX comes
from and how to evaluate and avoid them. In the final chapter of the thesis, we demonstrate
how to secure a non-trivial application using Intel SGX and we have a performance analysis




1.1 Background and Motivation
Security has became the one of the most important concerns when building modern ap-
plications or systems. The ambition of this work is to have a better understanding of the
hardware-assisted security technology proposed by Intel, i.e., the Intel Software Guard Ex-
tension (SGX)[29]. We quite know that to promote a novel technology, the technology itself
must be efficient and easy to use, so we pay special attention to evaluate the performance
and usability of Intel SGX and its platforms. We identify where the performance overhead
of Intel SGX comes from and classify them into three categories. We show a demonstration
of securing OpenCV[5] using SGX platform; and finally, performance analysis are performed
to evaluate the usability of each OpenCV module and the entire library.
1.2 Problem Statement
The motivation of introducing hardware-assisted security technologies is to secure appli-
cations or systems against some traditional attacks. When a technology or a product is
introduced, the first question is simple and clear:
• Q1: How to use hardware-assisted security technologies to secure applications?
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Although the security guarantee is of the most important, we cannot ignore the perfor-
mance problem of the Intel SGX and SGX platforms. If the performance overhead is totally
unacceptable, convincing developers to switch to a novel security technology with great per-
formance compromise is impossible. Thus, the second question is about the performance:
• Q2: How to evaluate the performance of SGX applications and platforms? Do they
have acceptable performance overhead?
When using Intel SGX and its platform, there might be some difference between building
traditional software and SGX applications, so the third question is about the best practice
of using Intel SGX and its platforms:
• Q3: What kinds of applications are well suited for SGX environment? What do we
need to pay attention with when building SGX applications?
1.3 Contributions
The major contributions of this work are listed below:
• A comprehensive introduction to Intel SGX, SGX programming model, and a simple
tutorial of building SGX applications.
In the chapter 2 we have detailed information on SGX and SGX programming, and
this can answer Q1.
• An in-depth performance analysis of native SGX and SGX platfroms.
In the chapter 3 we have a through evaluation of the Intel SGX and its platforms and
we conclude some tips for developers, and this can answer Q2 and Q3.
• A secured version of OpenCV powered by Intel SGX and its performance analysis.
In the chapter 4 we show how to secure OpenCV using a SGX platform and we evaluate




This chapter will introduce some technical background: basic security concepts, concepts and
classification of trusted computing, and the Intel SGX. We will also go through a demon-
stration of how to build a simple SGX application from a developer’s perspective.
2.1 Security Concepts
In this section, we will introduce some basic concepts in computer security, and these basic
concepts will present throughout the entire thesis when describing the security of Intel Soft-
ware Guard Extensions (SGX) technology. Basic goals which mostly accepted by security
community are confidentiality, integrity and availability. We will also go through concepts
of authenticity and anonymity.
2.1.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the avoidance and prevention of unauthorized disclosure of information[28].
This involving protection of data, providing access to people who are allowed to use and see,
while denying those who do not have access to it.
To achieve confidentiality, a significant amount of tools and methods were introduced by
computer security researchers, and these tools support functionalities of encryption, access
control, authentication and authorization.
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2.1.2 Integrity
Integrity is another aspect of computer security, which means any information has not be
modified by any people in any unauthorized means[28].
Ransomware is a great example of how information integrity can be compromised[35]. Fun-
damentally, ransomware is a form of malware that encrypts a victim’s files and what an
attacker wants is money. Typically, a victim will be taught how to make the payment, and
told the encrypted files will not be recovered unless the payments is completed.
To achieve integrity, administrators must regularly verify the data has not been modified. As
for verification, there are multiple ways such as using checksum and data correcting codes,
and it is always recommended to backup data periodically for future recovery.
2.1.3 Availability
Availability is the property that information is available and modifiable in a timely manner
when those who authorized request it[28].
Information can be considered safe when it is extremely difficult for anyone to get access;
however, it cannot be considered practically secure in this case, since it violates the goal of
availability. We all know that the quality of some information is directly associated with
the availability, e.g., stock and currency. If we do not have access to the most up-to-date
data and information, it will be difficult for us to evaluate the importance and correctness
of them, therefore unable to make the correct decision.
Because availability is also extremely important, attackers might simply choose to break the
availability when they cannot steal or modify it without being noticed. The interruption or
significant slowdown of information access by overwhelming the target machine with high
network load (e.g., a web server) can be classified as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack[32], and
it is a typical example of attack on availability.
To achieve and maintain availability, administrators must have plans even in emergency
situations. For example, administrators maintaining critical web servers might use some
4
physical protections against earthquakes, storms and severe temperature. And they may
also take advantage of redundant arrays of inexpensive disks (RAID) to store redundancies
to keep data available if the main server failed.
2.1.4 Authenticity
Authenticity is the ability to determine that actions or permissions are genuine[28]. The
property of authenticity is a must in a secure system, because any other protections will
be meaningless if a single fabricated password is approved. To achieve authenticity, we
sometimes use digital signatures.
2.1.5 Anonymity
Anonymity is the property of interacting and communicating without been traced and found
the real identity[28]. In ideal situations, users can send information using a pseudonym and
not be identified by system administrators. This is because combining and mixing of data
from individuals makes it difficult for the administrator to keep track of a specific identity.
2.2 Trusted Computing
This section describes some basic concepts and technologies related to Trusted Computing
(TC), including Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
along with its hardware requirement, and Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
Trusted computing is a technology which first introduced by the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG)[30, 20]. Four basic components of trusted computing framework are attestation,
isolation, secure storage and secure I/O. With the help of them, the computer will behave
under expectation enforced by hardware and software security check. However, trusted
computing is controversial because the enforcement either by software, hardware or their
incorporation is not just secured for its owner, but also against its owner[1], which can cause
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the usability problem. Besides, the loss of anonymity can also be a serious problem: trusted
computing needs to identify the uniqueness of a computer, which means it is possible for
those trusted computing solution providers to keep track of a user’s identity and even more
than this.
In general, trusted computing is a double-edged sword so that the decision of switching to
trusted computing solution needs to be made carefully and in a case-by-case manner. Sys-
tem administrators are responsible for evaluating the needed security level, implementation
complexity, usability and entire cost, then to choose the most appropriate solution. They
also need to decide which part of system needs to be secured by trusted computing, because
experience tells us it is a bad idea to put everything in a trusted environment. We will
discuss more about this later in this section.
2.2.1 Trusted Platform Module
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a standard for a secure cryptoprocessor[37], and it is a
fundamental component of a trusted platform and the core of the trusted computing. It was
first standardized by ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the
International Electrotechnical Commission) as ISO/IEC 11889[17].
There are five variations of TPM[3], namely discrete TPM, integreted TPM, firmware TPM,
software TPM and virtual TPM. Each variation has its own security level, security features,
implementation complexity, and of course, cost. Generally speaking, a TPM with higher
security level has higher implementation complexity, and needs higher cost. Among these
variations, firmware TPM has high (but not the highest) security level , and is the most
suitable and most widely used solution for personal computers nowadays.
2.2.2 Trusted Execution Environment
Protected software and some special hardware components are needed for implementing
firmware TPM, but a separate chip is not necessary. With firmware TPM, the program exe-
cutes on the main CPU, or more specifically, in a special secure execution environment named
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trusted execution environment (TEE)[39]. A TEE is separated from the traditional program
execution environment and they cannot communicate with each other without special in-
structions. The isolation makes it possible for administrators to seal and store credentials
(e.g., a private key) in a TEE and prevent unauthorized access from outside TEE, thus
greatly enhances the security level of the entire computer system.
Vendors and researchers have developed numbers of hardware technologies to support TEE
implementations including AMD memory encryption [23], ARM TrustZone[27], Intel Soft-
ware Guard Extensions, and RISC-V MultiZone[21]. Each technology has its advantages
and drawbacks. Among them, Intel SGX is the mostly used and many prior research work
[22, 9, 2] have been done to enhance its usability. We will discuss more on Intel SGX in the
next section.
TEE is not flawless: there is no perfect solution for trusted computing nowadays. Ad-
ministrators experience the difficulty of setting up a TEE and users have to withstand the
performance overhead. In this thesis, we will focus on analysis and evaluation of performance
overhead on several frameworks and solutions based on Intel SGX.
2.2.3 Trusted Computing Base
For a computer system, the trusted computing base (TCB) is comprised of hardware, software
and firmware components that are critical to security[30]. The major responsibility of a TCB
is to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of data on a system. The TCB in a system
typically has the highest level of trust, so if a design flaw exists in a TCB, the overall system
may be compromised. Thus, it is extremely important to protect the TCB from any kind
of attack or insecure implementation. In practice, it is not hard to expect that a TCB is
easiest to protect if its size and complexity are minimized. To secure more, we start from
trusting less, so the minimization of a TCB is of great importance.
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2.3 Intel SGX Explained
The Intel SGX is a set of extension to the Intel architectures. It has the ambition of provid-
ing security guarantees to user-space applications with the help of isolated memory region,
known as enclave. Even the privilege software components (BIOS, OS, hypervisor, etc) are
compromised, protected applications in enclaves remains secure and safe[29].
SGX relies on software attestation, i.e., proves to a user that he or she is communicating with
a specific and trusted software running in a secure environment which located in the trusted
hardware[16]. The proof is a hash of the content of the secure environment. Although the
software entity can be load by any software or services, it will refuse to reveal any private
data if the signature does not match. However, SGX is not flawless, prior works show that
SGX can be cracked by multiple side-channel attacks[6, 31].
Unlike discrete TPM, SGX has a smaller TCB. The method utilized by discrete TPM is
to build a chain of trust and tries to include all the software running on a machine, while
SGX only covers code and data that we truly want to protect. SGX encapsulates them into
an enclave image, which can be safely loaded into the enclave memory for later execution.
Another advantage of SGX over discrete TPM is that discrete TPM requires a independent




SGX Physical Memory Organization












Figure 2.1: SGX physical memory organization
An Intel CPU with SGX allocates a reserved memory region with the help of BIOS, called
the Processor Reserved Memory (PRM)[16]. The PRM is a contiguous subset of the DRAM
and the size of PRM can be configured. The CPU protects the PRM from all memory access
unless the the access is initiated directly from an enclave. Even accesses from the kernel or
hypervisor are prohibited.
The Enclave Page Cache (EPC) is a subset of the PRM that store the content of enclave
data and code. To support multiple enclaves on the machine at the same time, which can
be utilized for data isolation, an EPC is split into multiple 4 KB pages. The size of 4 KB
is not a random pick, as the virtual memory pages in an enclave are also set to 4 KB. This
design is useful when memory address are translated from physical to virtual, and vice versa.
Non-enclave software cannot directly access the EPC, as it is contained in the PRM. This
restriction plays the core role in SGX security guarantees.
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The SGX is not responsible for allocating EPC pages, and it requires the system software to
allocate the EPC pages when creating enclaves. But the problem is the system software is
not trusted by the SGX. In face, it may allocate some EPC pages that can compromise the
SGX security guarantees. One simple example is that a memory allocator may allocate the
same EPC page to two different enclaves because of the Copy-on-Write (CoW) convention,
but this is malicious and will break Intel SGX security guarantees. To solve this, allocator’s
decision for each EPC page will be recorded in the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM).
The EPCM is an array that holds one entry for each EPC page and Table 2.1 shows the
information used for EPCM to keep track the ownership of each EPC page.
Field Bits Description
VALID 1 0 for un-allocated EPC pages
PT 0 page type (PT REG, PT SECS, etc.)
ENCLAVESECS identifies the enclave owning the page
Table 2.1: EPCM fields and descriptions (physical memory related)
After allocating an EPC page, the VALID bit of corresponding EPCM entry will be set to
1, and next time when a allocation happens, system software will safely skip the EPC page
with the VALID bit set to 1 to guarantee there is no shared memory region for any EPC
page. As for the page type (PT), most EPC pages have the type of regular (PT REG), while
some EPC pages have the special type of (PT SECS), indicating these EPC pages contain
SGX Enclave Control Structures (SECS). Each SECS is stored in a dedicated EPC page
that does not store any enclave data, but store only the metadata of the enclave.
The SECS is a per-enclave structure, which means each enclave has a corresponding EPC
page to store the SECS. The SECS is very important and goes through the entire life cycle of
an enclave: we create an EPC page for SECS before allocating enclave data EPC pages; and
we destroy the EPC page with SECS after we de-allocate the enclave data EPC pages. This
is similar to a malloc-free pair in C programming language. The EPC pages that stored
enclave data will record their corresponding EPC page with SECS, and these information
will be put in the ENCALVESECS filed.
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SGX Enclave Memory Organization
All SGX instuctions take virtual addresses as input, and we have to fill the gap between phys-
ical addresses to virtual addresses. Figure 2.2 shows the SGX virtual memory organizaiton.








by System Software DRAM
Figure 2.2: SGX virtual memory organization
An EPC page can only be accessed within a dedicated memory region called Enclave Linear
Address Range (ELRANGE). An enclave image is loaded in the ELRANGE like a dynamic
library, and maps sensitive code and data into ELRANGE. When the host application ac-
cesses ELRANGE memory, it will experience an abort semantics and switch to enclave
application’s view to access the sensitive code and data.
Table 2.2 shows virtual memory related fields of EPCM. ADDRESS shows the virtual address
used to access the EPC page, and R, W, and X represent the EPC can or cannot be read,
written, and executed, respectively. Although the hardware mechanism protects EPC pages
from non-enclave access, the access privilege inside enclave must be checked.
Field Bits Description
ADDRESS 48 the virtual address used to access this page
R 1 allow reads by enclave code
W 1 allow writes by enclave code
X 1 allow execution of code inside the page, inside enclave
Table 2.2: EPCM fields and descriptions (virtual memory related)
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2.3.2 Life Cycle of an Enclave
Creation
An enclave is created when an ECREATE instruction is issued. The creation of an enclave
makes a free EPC page into a valid page that stores the SECS for the newborn enclave.
SECS also determines the base address and size of the ELRNAGE, and stores these values
in BASEADDR and SIZE fields in the SECS, respectively.
Loading
The ECREATE instruction marks a newborn SECS as uninitialized (but have already been
created). An enclave must have its own data and code. When a SECS is in uninitialized
state, the EADD instruction is used to load initial data and code to the enclave.
Initialization
After the loading process is done, the system software must invoke a privileged enclave
provided by Intel, i.e., the Launch Enclave (LE) to mark the enclave to initialized state.
The EINIT instruction is used during this process.
Teardown
After an enclave finishes its job, the system software issues the EREMOVE instruction to
deallocate corresponding EPC pages. EREMOVE marks corresponding VALID fields of
EPCM to 0, indicating they are not occupied by any enclave. After all these EPC pages
have been deallocated, the final step of destroying an enclave can be performed: the SECS
of an enclave will also be removed and destroyed.
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2.4 Intel SGX Programming
We have a discussion on the mechanism of Intel SGX. Naturally, the next step is to discuss
how to utilize the security benefits of SGX and how to build SGX programs. Unlike tra-
ditional programming models, Intel SGX programming has some unique requirements, on
both hardware and software environments. Building SGX applications needs the support of
SGX SDK and a tool designed by Intel, and running SGX applications in a trusted execution
environment requires the SGX Driver and a dedicated machine. In this section, we will have
a thorough overview on hardware and software environment of Intel SGX, and then have a
demonstration on how to write and build a simple SGX application.
2.4.1 Hardware Requirements
Intel SGX was first introduced in 2015 along with the release of 6th generation (Skylake)
Intel CPUs. Skylake and newer generations is a must for enabling SGX. However, we must
notice that not all PCs with a new Intel CPU support SGX, e.g., to the best of my knowledge,
none of Apple’s PC fully supports SGX by now. We still need support from the motherboard
and BIOS. Since a motherboard BIOS is most likely provided by third-party vendors and
they do not typically provide such a detail specification, it is difficult for users to determine
if there is support for SGX before they purchase any hardware. To resolve this, unofficial
lists of hardware and tools that can determine SGX support is a great starting point[4]. In
most situations, the SGX features are not enabled by default, so we should enable them
manually. The BIOS will expand Processor Reserved Memory (PRM) at a typical size of
128MB, making it exclusive to SGX related code and applications[16].
2.4.2 Software Requirements
Intel provides SGX software support for both Windows and Linux operating systems. In this
section we will only focus on SGX software stack in Linux operating systems (e.g., Ubuntu
16.04). The Linux SGX software stack is the collection of the Intel SGX driver, the Intel
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SGX Software Development Kit (SDK), and the Intel SGX Platform Software (PSW). Intel
holds repositories [10, 12, 11] on GitHub for public access.
SGX Platform Software
The SGX PSW is the prerequisite of running a SGX program. It provides the platform
services, run-time attestation components as well as the SGX driver. PSW contains the
utilities that support three major functionalities: launch service, Enclave Page ID based
attestation service, and algorithm agnostic attestation service. Among them, launch service
is of the most important, since every SGX application should start with loading and initial-
izing enclaves. To make SGX applications run properly, the Architectural Enclave Service
Manager Daemon (AESMD) service should also to turned on so that applications can utilize
Architectural Enclaves (AE) such as Launch Enclave (LE) to load and run an enclave[16].
SGX Software Development Kit
The Intel SGX SDK provides a collection of APIs, libraries and tools that can assist software
developers to build SGX application in C/C++ running in a SGX enabled environment. The
SGX SDK is comprised of four major components: Untrusted Run-Time System (uRTS),
Trusted Run-time System (tRTS), Edge Routines as well as third party libraries[13].
The Untrused Run-Time System (uRTS) runs outside of the enclaves, and that is why they
are been called “untrusted”. The uRTS is responsible for loading and managing enclave, as
well as sending enclave calls (ECALLs) to and receiving outside calls (OCALLs) from an
enclave.
The Trusted Run-Time System (tRTS) runs insides of the enclaves, and by definition, they
are “trusted”. The tRTS is responsible for receiving calls (ECALLs) from outside and making
responses (OCALLs) to outside untrusted environment. The tRTS also contains carefully
designed SGX-enabled C/C++ standard libraries.
Some low-level functions are served as glue for trusted and untrusted communication, and
they may execute inside an enclave (trusted edge routines) or outside an enclave (untrused
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edge routines). The edge routine functions are complicated and full of low-level details, so
writing edge routines directly can be difficult and inefficient. Fortunately, a tool edger8r
which developed by Intel resolves this issue, and developers just need to focus on higher level
API and code and split them into trusted and untrusted parts properly[15].
Intel also built the Intel Software Guard Extensions SSL (Intel SGX SSL) cryptographic
library[14] on top of OpenSSL Open Source project[18] to provide cryptographic services for
SGX applications. This is also an great example of porting an non-trivial application to the
SGX environment.
2.4.3 A Simple Tutorial
Trusted Code
Unlike traditional programming model, developers must to split their code into trusted and
untrusted parts. Code and data that developers want to keep them secure must be explicitly
put into a trusted world, that is, an enclave. An enclave is self-contained and will be
compiled to a binary called an enclave image. Whenever running a SGX application, the
AESMD service will invoke the Architectural Enclaves, load the application enclaves into
EPC pages in the protected memory and then execute.
As mentioned above, developers can only access an enclave by defining and using the access-
points. Theses access-points are defined using a Encalve Definition Language (EDL). An
EDL file shows a collection of access-points for an enclave as well as the included trusted
libraries and other data structures. An EDL file first includes trusted libraries that a devel-
oper want to use in this enclave if any, followed by prototypes of trusted ECALL functions
and then untrusted OCALL functions.
Listing 2.1 shows that an EDL file which contains five ECALL functions and one OCALL
functions. The ECALLs should be put into the trusted section with the prefix public,
and the OCALL is put into the untrusted section. The function ecall_print_secret and
ecall_print_updated_secret print an enclave’s secret and updated secret, respectively. The
function ecall_return_value is a demo of how a return value can be retrieved with an
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ECALL. The function ecall_array_increment discuss the data marshalling as well as the
user-specified boundary. The function ecall_user_check demonstrates how to use a user-
checked function pointers. The functions above are all ECALLs and they are implemented
in a C file reserved for enclave implementation, typically named enclave.c. The OCALL
function ocall_print_string, however, must be implemented in untrusted application code,
typically named app.c.
1 enclave {
2 trusted { // Your ECALLs here
3 public void ecall_print_secret();
4
5 public void ecall_print_updated_secret();
6
7 public int ecall_return_value();
8
9 public void ecall_array_increment(
10 [in, out, count=len] int *array,
11 int len);
12
13 public void ecall_user_check([user_check] int *ptr);
14 };
15 untrusted { // Your OCALLs here
16 void ocall_print_string([in, string] const char *str);
17 };
18 };
Listing 2.1: Enclave definitions
Listing 2.2 shows the implementation of trusted functions, and many of them are self-
explained. But we still should notice that:
• Not all of them are ECALLs, such as the function update_secret and printf.
• The ECALL ecall_array_increment is a dual data marshalling function with keywords
in and out, which means that information in array can go either direction, and devel-
opers are expected to provide the size of marshalling data when calling this ECALL
function.
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• The function printf is not the function in standard library <stdio.h>. In fact, trusted
version of <stdio.h> does not support the traditional printf function: we need to
build an OCALL like ocall_print_string, to print a string. The function printf here
is only a wrapper for easy use.
• The keyword user_check means we interpret a pointer as its original address, i.e., the
address in the untrusted memory.
Bring an untrusted memory address into an enclave can be a problem, because we need to
differentiate it from a trusted memory address, which can be misleading.
1 char *secret = "I am the SGX secret\n";
2
3 void ecall_print_secret() {
4 printf("[trusted] %s", secret);
5 }
6
7 void update_secret() {
8 secret = "I am the updated SGX secret\n";
9 }
10
11 void ecall_print_updated_secret() {
12 update_secret();
13 printf("[trusted] %s", secret);
14 }
15




20 void ecall_array_increment(int *array, int len) {
21 printf("[trusted] %p\n", array);





26 void ecall_user_check(int *ptr) {
27 printf("[trusted] %p\n", ptr);
28 }
29
30 void printf(const char *fmt, ...)
31 {
32 char buf[BUFSIZ] = {’\0’};
33 va_list ap;
34 va_start(ap, fmt);
35 vsnprintf(buf, BUFSIZ, fmt, ap);
36 va_end(ap);
37 ocall_print_string(buf); // invoking the OCALL function
38 }
Listing 2.2: Enclave implementations
Application Code
Listing 2.3 shows the entry code of a SGX application (printing statements and other unim-
portant statements are ignored). It is the untrusted code that runs in the traditional unsafe
environment, therefore, it cannot process any sensitive data directly by definition. However,
we still need it to initialize and load enclaves, and to execute ECALLs to process sensitive
information in enclaves.
1 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
2 {












14 for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++)
15 array[i] = 1;
16 ecall_array_increment(global_eid, array, 5);
17
18
19 int *ptr = (int *)malloc(sizeof(int));






Listing 2.3: Entry of application code (printing statements excluded)
Listing 2.4 shows a sample output generated by the above application. The prefix in each
line indicates that data in this line is either trusted or untrusted execution environment. As
we can see in line 4 and 5, the very same function pointer’s address is interpreted in different
ways by untrusted and trusted environment, which means they are isolated from each other
by default. But when a user_check keyword is provided in the ECALL ecall_user_check, it
is the developer’s responsibility to remember that the pointer is from untrusted environment.
And in this case, trusted and untrusted environment have the same view for this user-checked
pointer, so that their addresses are the same. E.g, in this case, see line 7 and line 8.
1 [trusted] I am the SGX secret




6 [untrusted] 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
7 [untrusted] 0xf2b0b0
8 [trusted] 0xf2b0b0
Listing 2.4: Sample outputs
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Some utility functions and OCALLs are also implemented in the main application. The
utility function initialize_enclave is widely used for creating enclaves and the OCALL
ocall_print_string is used for printing debug information.
1 int initialize_enclave(void)
2 {
3 /* Step 1: try to retrieve the launch token saved by last transaction




8 /* Step 2: call sgx_create_enclave to initialize an enclave instance */
9 ret = sgx_create_enclave(
10 ENCLAVE_FILENAME, // enclave image
11 SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, // 1 for debug on, 0 otherwise
12 &token, // token file
13 &updated, // 1 for token file is updated, 0 otherwise
14 &global_eid, // enclave id










Listing 2.5: Enclave initialization implementation




Listing 2.6: OCALL print function implementation
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Supplementary Tools
Figure 2.3 shows the process of generating binary and enclave image. As mentioned above,
the low-level edge routines are the actual functions executing when an ECALL or an OCALL
invoked. These details are quite distracting and make it inefficient for developing SGX
applications. Fortunately, a tool named Edger8r included in the SGX SDK is responsible
for parsing the EDL files and generating the trusted and untrusted routines between the
application and the enclave. These auto-generated files have default names. Enclave_u.c/.h
are generated in the application side, and Enclave_t.c/.h are generated in the enclave side.
To utilize those routines, developers must explicitly include these SDK generated code as
well as Run-Time System library <sgx_urts.h> and <sgx_trts.h> accordingly.
Figure 2.3: Process of generating executable binary and enclave image
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Chapter 3
Performance Analysis of Native SGX
and SGX Platforms
In this chapter, we will have discussion on performance of native Intel SGX and SGX plat-
forms. We will find where the performance overhead comes from and classify the factors
into three categories: switching delay, computation related and memory access related. We
will also setup experiments and evaluate how these factors can affect the performance and
usability of Intel SGX.
3.1 Performance Overhead of Native SGX
This sections presents three factors that affect the performance of native SGX applications
and SGX platforms. In general, we will review them individually and carefully, and answer
why and how these factors could have possibly negative impact on SGX applications.
3.1.1 Switching Delay
The switching delay comes from the switching from normal execution environment to trusted
execution environment, or vice versa. Many operations can introduce the switching delay,
e.g, an ECALL or OCALL, or even a system call. An ECALL or OCALL will obviously
slow down the execution because of switching between trusted environment and untrusted
environment[42, 19]. As for a system call, it can not be executed inside a SGX environment
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directly, and needs to be executed outside. Therefore, a system call is comprised in an
OCALL for native SGX applications. Same as an OCALL, switching to the normal execution
environment to perform a system call will inevitable introduce a delay. Switching delay is
the major source of overhead for some I/O intensive applications, to reduce the overhead,
developers need to invoke ECALLs, OCALLs wisely.
3.1.2 Computation Related
The computation related overhead is small and negligible. For most modern processors and
compilers, they will try to place most variables of a function (in a program) in registers for
best access and execution time. Since a SGX program utilizes the CPU in the same way that
a normal program do, if necessary optimization is presented and the workload is not memory
intensive, the performance overhead for a computation intensive workload is negligible.
3.1.3 Memory Access Related
The memory access related overhead is the major source of overhead for a memory access
intensive SGX program. Since SGX programs are executed in a special region with limited
memory, they will experience the memory paging delay if the EPC size is not enough for
them to execute. Although paging is common even in a normal execution, SGX programs are
more likely to suffer and suffer more from this[36]. Prior work shows that if the memory need
for a SGX application is at a very high level, it might not even start to execute properly[19].
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3.2 Analysis of Switching Delay
The switching delay of the Intel SGX happens every time when a SGX program tries to
cross the boundary between trusted and untrusted environment, i.e., whenever an ECALL or
OCALL happens. In this section, we will have discussion on how it can affect the performance
of SGX applications and evaluation of it.
3.2.1 Methodology
To evaluate the switching delay, we use two groups of functions. In general, functions in
group 1 do not have switching delay and functions in group 2 contain switching delay. For
group 1 which listed in Listing 3.1, it contains three functions which execute in the normal
execution environment. They can be executed in the normal environment directly, which
means invoking them does not require switching the environment, and therefore will not
introduce any switching delay. For group 2 which listed in Listing 3.2 and Listing 3.3, it
contains one OCALL and four ECALLs. To execute these functions, we must start from
untrusted part of the application and then switch to the SGX environment, therefore the
switching delay will be introduced. And an nested ecall_ocall function will even experience
such delay twice.
We write some simple and representative functions for normal and SGX environment. The
functions normal_empty and ecall_empty are the simplest functions that can reflect the in-
fluence of the switching delay; the function ecall_ocall is simplest ECALL-OCALL pair;
the functions normal and ecall_print can be used to show how print statements can slow-
down the execution; and the functions normal_malloc and ecall_malloc can be used to show
whether a simple memory allocation can affect the performance.
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Listing 3.1: Normal functions
1 void normal_empty()
2 {















Listing 3.2: OCALL function
1 void ocall_empty()
2 {
3 ; // do nothing
4 }
Listing 3.3: ECALL functions
1 void ecall_empty()
2 {





















For each experiment, we execute each function for one million times, and 50 runs for each
experiment are reported so that we can calculate the average. Figure 3.1 shows the results.
From the figure we can see that the switching delay is absolutely significant, e.g., an empty
ECALL ecall_empty is more than 2500x times slower than the normal_empty function in
the normal environment. The ecall_ocall function takes approximately double time of
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(a) Group 1: normal functions (b) Group 2: SGX functions
Figure 3.1: Performance of normal and SGX functions
ecall_empty and this is consistent with the fact that an ECALL which contains an OCALL
would experience the switching delay twice.
For the performance of normal_print and ecall_print functions we can see printing state-
ments will heavily affected the execution performance. In the normal environment, because
invoking a printf function involves system calls which can take a relatively longer time, the
performance is affected. And in the SGX environment, a print statement will introduce an
ECALL dealy and an OCALL switching delay plus preparing time for the string, as well
as the real printing time in the normal environment. In general, using a print statement in
the SGX environment is more than 250x times slower than using a printf directly in the
outside.
As for the ecall_malloc, its execution time is only slightly higher than the simplest ECALL
ecall_empty. This means the switching delay is the major source of performance overhead
compared to libc functions in the enclave and system calls outside.
In general, the surprisingly high performance overhead introduced by the switching delay
of Intel SGX needs to be pay attention with. Developers must build the SGX applications
wisely and try not to abuse the ECALL, OCALL or any other functions that will introduce
the significant switching delay.
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3.3 Analysis of Computation Intensive Workload
This section presents the analysis of computation intensive workload. We first goes through
the computation intensive workload which we choose: the stress-ng and its SGX version
stress-sgx, and then perform the experiment. Finally, we show a performance analysis of
computation intensive workload running in a SGX environment.
3.3.1 CPU Stress Test
A great example of computation intensive workload is the CPU stress test application. The
stress-ng is a tool that performs stress test to a computer system in various ways. It is de-
signed to test various functionalities and performance of a computer system and its subsys-
tems. The stress-ng supports multiple stressors (stress mechanisms) and multiple instances
of stressors can run at the same time. However, the stress-ng is not designed for running in
the SGX environment. In order to run the stress test in the SGX environment and put en-
claves in a high load, the ported SGX version of stress-ng, the stress-sgx has been introduced
in the prior work[41].
3.3.2 Evaluation
All experiments use Intel NUC7i5BNH with an i5-7260U processor with 4 cores at 2.20 GHz
with 4 MB cache and 12 GB main memory, and the host OS is Ubuntu 16.04 LTS 64-bit.
Since the machine has four cores, we create four stressor instances for both stress-ng and
stress-sgx, using various CPU stressors and keep them running for 60 seconds. We make
them execute ten times so that we can calculate the average performance statistics.
The parameter that we focus is the number of “bogo” operations. The “bogo” operations (or
“bogo” operations per real time second) is the measure of a stress test created by stress-ng
or stress-sgx. The size of a “bogo” operations depends on the type of stressor, and are only
comparable between stress tests that using the same stressor. Although the stress test is
not meant to be the scientifically accurate benchmarking metric, it can always give us some
rough sense.
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The statistics of the “bogo” operations and performance is listed in Table 3.1, ranging from
lowest performance overhead to highest. The overhead here is defined and discussed by










< 1 SGX is better than normal,
= 1 identical performance,
> 1 normal is better than SGX
(3.2)
Basically, if the overhead is smaller than one, the cpu stressor shows a better performance
in a SGX environment, and vice versa. The Table 3.1 tells us that the most cpu stressors
performance overhead are close to one, which means there are no significant slowdown when
running in an SGX environment compared to stress-ng in a normal environment. What is
more, some of them even shows better performance, e.g, hyperbolic, explog, and fft. The
overall overhead is 1.298, which is not a huge number. However, for some CPU stressors,
the slowdown is not negligible. Some stressor’s overhead are larger than 1.5, e.g., hanoi,
hamming, and the callfunc and ackermann stressors even shows a significant slowdown in an
SGX environment at the overhead of 2.877 and 4.082, respectively.
All these stressors with high overhead (i.e., poor performance in an SGX environment)
contain large amount of function calls. Some of them are classic recursive problems that
contain a lot of function calls, e.g., hanoi, hamming, ackermann, and callfunc. Besides,
the callfunc stressor is designed to invoke function calls repeatedly. In summary, we can
conclude that although invoking function calls always takes time, SGX environment seems
suffer more from doing so and will have poor performance.
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cpu stressor sgx/ops native/ops overhead
fft 147079.2 96264.9 0.655
explog 51560.3 38381.5 0.744
hyperbolic 356118.7 265163.4 0.745
factorial 2772294.7 2164025.9 0.781
idct 8328986.6 7624782.8 0.915
loop 5209792.5 4806023.9 0.922
omega 849213929.9 828142954.4 0.975
bitops 532234.6 527669.3 0.991
ln2 13314384.7 13735355.6 1.032
parity 2249085.4 2446941.1 1.088
crc16 29104.5 33136.5 1.139
gray 2784047.3 3184057.2 1.144
gcd 345060.1 396898.7 1.150
nsqrt 26856.5 31013 1.155
correlate 8306.4 9836.4 1.184
jenkin 7315521.6 8718239.7 1.192
euler 2531513286 3035166219 1.199
gamma 65047.8 80445.9 1.237
djb2a 17038784 21493209.7 1.261
fibonacci 2589914734 3344835222 1.291
fnv1a 16940672.3 22030862.2 1.300
jmp 11658819.1 16435452.3 1.410
hanoi 20571.2 31955.6 1.553
hamming 54579.5 94874.2 1.738
callfunc 17509766.4 50381666.7 2.877
ackermann 965.8 3942.7 4.082
Table 3.1: Statistics of CPU stressors
3.4 Analysis of Memory Access Intensive Workload
This section presents the analysis of memory access intensive workload. We first go through
the memory intensive workload: the stress-ng and stress-sgx are also used for memory stress
tests, and then perform the experiments. Finally, we show a performance analysis of memory
access intensive workload running in an SGX environment.
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3.4.1 Memory Stress Test
A great example of memory intensive workload is the memory stress test application. Again,
we use stress-ng and stress-sgx application because they can also be used for memory stress
test.
3.4.2 Evaluation
All experiments use Intel NUC7i5BNH with an i5-7260U processor with 4 cores at 2.20
GHz with 4 MB cache and 12 GB main memory, and the host OS is Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
64-bit. Since the machine has four cores, we create four stressor instances for both stress-ng
and stress-sgx, using various memory stressors and different memory load. We keep them
running for 60 seconds, and make them execute ten times so that we can calculate the average
performance statistics.
Again, the parameter that we focus is the number of “bogo” operations and “bogo” op-
erations per real time second. The “bogo” operations (or “bogo” operations per real time
second) is the measure of a stress test created by stress-ng or stress-sgx. The size of a “bogo”
operations depends on the type of stressor, and are only comparable between stress tests
that using the same stressor. Although the stress test is not meant to be the scientifically
accurate benchmarking metric, it can always give us some rough sense.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the results of memory stressors and there are two ways to interpret
it. The first measurement is that the percentage of each disk that filled with non-white color
represents the relative performance in a SGX environment, compared to the performance of
the stressors running on the native host machine. This means 50% full indicates that the
memory stressor in SGX can run at the half speed, compared to the speed of running in the
native environment. And a 100% full disk means the memory stressor is not affected by the
SGX environment. The second measurement is the color of the disk itself that represents the
relative performance. From high to low performance, the color is ranged from dark green,
light green, yellow, orange to red. It is not meant to be an accurate indicator, but in general,
a “greener” disk has higher relative performance than yellow or red ones.
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Figure 3.2: Relative performance of memory stressors in an SGX environment
From the figure we can conclude that the performance is not heavily affected when the
memory load is small, e.g., 4 MB. However, when the memory load grows to a amount larger
than the size of cache, the slowdown of execution is noticeable. In general, larger memory
load will make the performance even worse, and that is why the upper section of the figure
is much “greener” than the lower section.
What is more, the execution is also negatively affected by the random memory access. We
arrange stressors from sequential access to random access, except the all stressor which
take each stressor’s pattern in a round-robin manner that reflects the general situation. The
figure clearly tells us that the left half of stressors only have “red” performance when the
memory load rise to 256 MB, and they are much “greener” than the right half. Especially
for the gray and walk-0d, since they can enjoy “dark green” performance even if the memory
load is 64 MB. The right half of stressors, on the other hand, are suffered from the random
memory access, and the commonly presented “red” disks can prove our thought. Stressors
such as swap, prime-gray-1, prime-incdec and walk-1a are negatively affected even at a
small memory load, e.g., 16 MB.
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3.5 Analysis of SGX Platforms
This section presents the usability problems of Intel SGX and how it can be solved by SGX
platforms. We will have discussion on two of the Intel SGX platforms: Secure Container
Linux Containers with Intel SGX (SCONE), and a library OS for unmodified application
(Graphene-SGX). We will have performance evaluation on both platforms.
3.5.1 SGX Platforms
Intel SGX solves some important security problems, but it also brings some usability prob-
lems. For example, developers need to rewrite traditional programs to SGX capable pro-
grams. This requires developers to have a deep understanding of the programs as well as
the security and SGX knowledge. Although Intel offers a trusted C library in SGX SDK, it
is not complete and many functions are removed for security concerns. The fact is that they
have to build it from scratch, since not so many trusted version of applications or libraries
are available. Researchers basically try to solve the usability problems in the following two
ways: the first method is to set up special SGX platforms so that unmodified programs can
execute with little effort, and the second method is to port the traditional applications to
SGX applications. The second method seems exciting and some work has been published.
The Glamdring is a framework that can automatically analysis the program and port it to a
SGX program[26]. However, it is not open-sourced and released currently. Thus, utilizing a
SGX platform to protect the unmodified application with the help of Intel SGX is the best
option currently.
SCONE SCONE is a secure container mechanism designed for Dockers to protect process
inside with the help of the Intel SGX[2]. The design goals of the SCONE including small
trusted computing base (TCB) and low performance overhead. SCONE offers a trusted C
library and a control interface that can supports user-level multi-threading and system calls.
We will have discussion on SCONE in detail in the next chapter.
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Graphene-SGX Graphene-SGX is a library OS tries to solve the usability problem using
“shim” layers and it has some improvements like integrity support for dynamically-loaded
libraries[9]. Graphene-SGX supports a wide range of unmodified applications, including
Apache, GCC, and the R interpreter, and the performance overhead for single-process pro-
grams is typically less than 2 times.
3.5.2 Methodology
All experiments use Intel NUC7i5BNH with an i5-7260U processor with 4 cores at 2.20 GHz
with 4 MB cache and 12 GB main memory, and the host OS is Ubuntu 16.04 LTS 64-bit. We
evaluate two applications, Lis, Libsvm; and one benchmark suite, DIBS. We compare the
performance of three variants for each application: (i) one built with GNU C library (glibc)
and executes in the host OS; (ii) one build with musl C library and runs inside a SCONE
Docker container; and (iii) one built with GNU C library (glibc) and run in the Graphene-
SGX library OS. We use glibc to build these applications or benchmark in the first and third
setting is because the glibc is the standard C library for most Linux distributions. We run
each experiment for ten times so that we can calculate the average.
3.5.3 Application Benchmarks
Lis Library of Iterative Solvers for linear systems (Lis) is a mathematical library for solving
discrete linear equations and eigenvalue problems[33, 25, 24, 38]. Solving mathematical
problems involves complex operations and can possibly create a high memory load. Since
more and more complicated real world applications will be put into SGX environment, it is
necessary to evaluate the performance of math libraries.
We evaluate the performance of linear_solver and eigen_solver in each three different
settings. The size of problems (i.e., the size of matrix) are ranged from small (100x100),
medium (1000x1000) to large (5000x5000). Figure 3.3 shows the results.
As for Graphene, when the matrix sizes are medium and small, the execution time for both
problems is nearly identical to the native OS. However, if the size of the problem is small,
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the overhead of booting up the Graphene library OS is not negligible. But in general, the
overhead of running lis library in Graphene library OS is very small.
As for SCONE, no matter how large is the matrix, the performance overhead of running lis
library in SCONE is significant. When the size is small (100x100), SCONE are 3.7x and 2.8x
times slower in solving linear problem and eigenvalue problem than native OS, respectively;
when the size is medium (1000x1000), SCONE are 3.5x and 2.69x times slower. However, the
performance is even worse when the problem size is large (5000x5000), as these two numbers
surprisingly increase to 42.4 and 37.4, respectively.
(a) Linear Solver (b) Eigen Solver
Figure 3.3: Lis performance
Libsvm Libsvm is a simple and efficient library for solving SVM classification and regres-
sion problems[8]. Previously, machine learning communities spent a lot of efforts on efficiency
and usability, but the privacy problem in machine learning now attracts a lot of attention.
Many ways of protecting data privacy has been introduced and deployed such as differential
privacy. The traditional procedure is that users who do not have enough computation re-
sources have to upload their local data to a remote server which they may or may not trust,
and then wait until receive any results. Therefore, the security problem is almost inevitable:
users do not know if their data is carefully transmitted, stored and protected. However,
things can change in the next generations of machine learning libraries or any applications
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train/s predict/s
model size native Graphene SCONE native Graphene SCONE
w8a 3.4 MB 16.184 15.693 31.92 11.187 11.021 16.24
a3a.t 2.1 MB 37.802 36.246 77.61 23.672 22.73 32.79
w8a.t 1022 KB 1.513 1.933 5.938 1.186 1.664 4.849
w4a 504 KB 0.411 0.927 4.013 0.321 0.841 3.83
a1a 113 KB 0.131 0.67 3.584 0.101 0.634 3.558
Table 3.2: Libsvm performance
that use these libraries. They might let users to decide whether to upload local data for
processing. The ideal situation is that small amount of data can be trained and processed
locally, and data privacy can be guaranteed with the help of the Intel SGX or other hardware
assisted security technologies.
Table 3.2 shows the results of libsvm. We select five models ranged from 113 KB to 3.4 MB
and perform train and predict operations in three different environments. For each train or
predict, we repeat the experiment for ten times to calculate the average.
As we can see from Table 3.2, when the size of matrix is small, e.g., a1a is 113KB and
w4a is 504KB, the slowdown for train and predict are both significant. This is because the
“warm up” time for Graphene and SCONE to start a program takes up a large percentage
of execution time, which make it seem that performance overhead is as large as 5x times
for Graphene and even 30x times for SCONE. When the size of matrix grows larger, the
advantage of Graphene can be noticed easily. Graphene nearly enjoys the same execution
speed of native OS, while SCONE has a overhead of more than 2x times.
DIBS Data Integration Benchmark Suite (DIBS) is a suite of applications that select
some representative data integration workloads[7]. With the development of Intel SGX, its
libraries, and SGX applications and platforms, more and more amount and types of data
will be put into that small enclaves. Thus, the performance of these operations is becoming
more and more important in the near future.
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Figure 3.4: DIBS performance
We evaluate seven applications of DIBS in all three settings and Figure 3.4 shows the per-
formance overhead in Graphene and SCONE compared to native OS. We know that one
of the most important measurement of data related benchmarks is the data throughput.
Since the tested files are unchanged, the performance overhead also reflects the slowdown
of throughput. From the Figure 3.4 we can see that the slowdown of applications involving
converting to tiff files have much smaller than those applications dealing with csv files. We
may conclude this as the csv file format is not a good fit for the SGX environment, but this
is incorrect.
The major cause of this is about the implementation of applications. We examine the source
code of tstcsv->csv, gotrackcsv->csv and plt->csv and find that they are heavily relied
on some libc functions, e.g., strtok, strlen, while those with low performance overhead
do not have such reliance. These libc functions are even used for thousands of millions of
times due to the size of data. So, they would generate thousands of millions of system calls.
Since system calls cannot be executed within a SGX environment, it must be switched to
normal environment and talks to the Linux kernel directly, therefor introducing a signifi-
cant switching delay. SCONE tries to solve this using an asynchronous system call interface
with a scheduling algorithm, but it still has a significant delay when such a large number
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of system calls presents. Graphene-SGX does a relatively better job because it is a library
OS that provides a shim layer and substitutes these system calls with its own implementa-
tions. However, no matter what kind of mechanism that a SGX platform utilized to reduce
the switching delay, it still exists and sometimes can be a huge problem. This is a great
reminder for SGX application developers that only invoke a system call if truly necessary
when developing data integration applications.
3.6 Summary
This chapter discuss the performance of native Intel SGX and SGX platforms. We classify
the causes into three categorizes: switching delay, computation related and memory access
related. In general, the switching delay and memory access delay are noticeable and some-
times significant. We further evaluate performance of two applications and a library running
in SCONE and Graphene-SGX, respectively. We then some discussions on what needed to
be pay attention when building SGX applications.
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Chapter 4
Securing the OpenCV using Intel
SGX
This chapter will have discussion on securing real-world applications with the help of hardware-
assisted security technologies such as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). We choose
Open Source Computer Vision Library (OpenCV) as an example, use the Secure Linux Con-
tainers with Intel SGX (SCONE) platform to secure the application entirely. We will also
have a thorough analysis on the performance of OpenCV in trusted execution environment.
4.1 Introduction
This section will have discussion on the background of OpenCV and the motivation of pro-
tecting it against various types of attacks.
4.1.1 OpenCV
Open Source Computer Vision Library (OpenCV) is one of the most widely utilized computer
vision library written in C++ programming language[5]. More than 2500 algorithms can be
found in the OpenCV library, which includes a comprehensive list of classic and modern
computer vision algorithms, and also, machine learning algorithms. All these algorithms can
be applied to a variety of tasks, e.g., facial recognition, object identification and classification,
image and video processing, and many more. OpenCV also has portability. Although written
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in C++, it provides Python, Java and MATLAB interfaces which supports running on
Windows, Linux, Mac OS and even Android. OpenCV aims to be a real-time vision library,
so it also takes advantage of Matrix Math Extensions (MMX) and Stream SIMD Extensions
(SSE) instruction sets when possible. OpenCV community is actively working on interfaces
that support Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) and Open Computing Language
(OpenCL)[34, 40].
4.1.2 Motivation
Nowadays, with the increasing size of image, video or other types of data that people want to
process, local computational resources has become a bottleneck. People prefer to submit their
data to servers with sufficient computation power. However, this can lead to a brand new
problem: do we trust people behind those servers and do we trust their security mechanisms?
Despite network security issues, data which uploaded by users stored in a server may or may
not in an encrypted way, since encrypting data, especially a huge amount of data takes time
and resources. This means sensitive data will eventually be transparent to administrators
and can be accessed easily at some time, no matter what kinds of security features have
been applied, because machine learning and image processing algorithms need honest input
to process.
Because software and network vulnerabilities can always been identified in attack vectors,
researchers and companies have tried to find solution to such problem in system level as well
as hardware level. The hardware-assisted security features such as the Intel SGX and ARM
TrustZone can resolve this issues in varying degrees. In terms of OpenCV, the Intel SGX is
the better solutions over ARM TrustZone. It is not only because writing ARM TrustZone
compatible applications is even more difficult than working with Intel SGX, but OpenCV is
mostly used in desktop operating systems with a chip manufactured by Intel.
Although previous works shows that porting some non-trivial applications or libraries proved
to be possible, working on writing SGX application can be tedious and challenging, especially
for such a large and complicated library. Developers must have deep understanding of the
whole application to partition the trusted and untrusted code. They also need to verify the
SGX-enabled library have the identical behaviors to the original code. Currently, there is
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no open source solution on partitioning applications or libraries automatically. Although we
can borrow some thoughts and insights from Glamdring[26], this is still an open question.
Therefore, using a SGX platform seems to be a simple and practical way. Secure Linux
Containers with Intel SGX (SCONE) is a secure container mechanism for Docker that utilizes
the Intel SGX to protect processes inside Docker containers being attacked from outside
environment, and it supports unmodified programs running in containers as long as it can
be built by its SCONE compilers. According to these features, using SCONE to secure the
OpenCV library is feasible and perfectly meet our needs.
4.2 Technical Background
In this section we will first present the technologies that we use. We will discuss them one
after another and then explain why these technologies can be used to secure the OpenCV,
and potentially, other applications.
4.2.1 Intel SGX
As we mentioned in the previous section, the OpenCV is mostly deployed in desktop oper-
ating systems. Thus, to find a solution which can be applied to desktop operating systems
is a must. Considering the market share of Intel’s processors, the hardware-assisted security
technology proposed by Intel - the Intel SGX can be a great candidate, obviously. However,
there is still a long way from choosing it to actually using it. The SGX programming model
requires developers to modify applications, partition them to trusted and untrusted part,
this can be a great amount of work. Currently, the usability of Intel SGX, especially for a
large-scale software is low, we may need to find a way of putting the whole application into
the enclave, even it can enlarge the size of trusted computing base (TCB) greatly.
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4.2.2 Linux Container
The concept of container is not a new thing. To resolve infamous software dependencies
problem, several implementations of containers include LXC (Linux Containers), LXD (new
generations of LXC), and Docker have been proposed. Most implementations use some the
Linux kernel features such as namespaces and cgroup to provide OS-level virtualization,
isolation and resource management. Among these implementations, the Docker is the de
facato standard of the container. The introduction of the container not only resolves the
software dependencies issue, but it also provides some security guarantees - processes running
inside a container do not have chances of talking to outside environment directly unless we
explicitly change the configurations, and they do not have unlimited computational resources
by default. The container is also very light-weighted compared to traditional virtual machine
(VM), since it does not need to boot up an entire operating system to start the application.
4.2.3 Approach: running in the SCONE
The Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX (SCONE) is a secure container mechanism for
Docker that makes the use of the Intel SGX. The benefits of using SCONE include small
amount of work to put application in trusted execution environment, small TCB size, and
acceptable performance overhead.
Figure 4.1 shows an overview of the SCONE design.
External interface In order to run unmodified applications inside the containers, the
containers must have C standard library (libc) interface. And to reduce the TCB size of the
SCONE, it uses Linux Kernel Library (LKL) and the musl libc library. However, system
calls which invoked by libc is prohibited inside of an enclave, so the SCONE exposes an
external interface to the host OS. To expose such things can be a problem, because host OS
can initiate various attacks. To protect applications in the container, especially for those
using unencrypted way of sending information, SCONE supports some shields. These shields
include file system shield, network shield, and console shield.
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Figure 4.1: SCONE architecture
M:N threading and asynchronous system calls SCONE offers M:N threading mech-
anism to reduce the unnecessary transition from enclave to host OS, and vice versa. The
scheduler of SCONE maps M application threads to N OS threads. Notice that these threads
are all in the enclave since the entire application has been put in the trusted execution en-
vironment provided by the Intel SGX. The number of application threads (M) is a variable
that can be a large number, while the number of OS threads (N) is typically set to the
number of hardware threads that a machine can support. To avoid unnecessary transitions,
the idea of SCONE scheduler is to maintain the “liveliness” of OS threads and forbid appli-
cation threads talk to the Linux kernel individually and directly. OS threads in the enclave
are man-in-the-middle and they served as an agency. They are extremely busy since they
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are responsible for retrieving system call requests in the requests queue one after another.
These requests are initiated by application threads, waiting to be forwarded to the SCONE
kernel modules by OS threads. Whenever a response is available, it would be placed in a
response queue so that an OS thread can retrieve and forward it to the target application
thread. Both requests and responses queues are implemented in the way of shared memory.
Docker integration SCONE integrates with Docker, and to support full functionalities
of SCONE, host OS needs a SCONE kernel module and a customized Docker engine. What
is more, each container requires a startup configuration file (SCF) to start. The SCF is not
included in the Docker image because SGX does not protect the confidentiality of code inside
an enclave. Instead, it is sent to the enclave over the TLS secured channel after the enclave
has been verified. The SCF contains some very important information, e.g, keys that used
to encrypt the I/O stream, hash of some other protected files. Only after all of the security
checks are passed that a SCONE container can start up.
4.3 Evaluation
This section is split into two parts. In the first part, we present the experiment setup of
the SCONE version of the OpenCV as well as the Alpine version of the OpenCV. In the
second part, we present the performance overview of the SCONE OpenCV and performance
analysis of each OpenCV module.
4.3.1 Experiment Setup
To run a SCONE version of OpenCV, we must first launch a SCONE Docker container with
a special musl libc compiler and build it from source. Since the image of SCONE is based
on Alpine Linux, we may take some extra amount of work. One issue of the Alpine Linux is
that many applications or libraries do not have official release or build instructions, which
means we have to build them from scratch with great care. If these applications or libraries
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happened to be one of the dependency of the target application, it will take a lot of time to
finish these tedious work.
We chose OpenCV version 3.4.1, the host OS is Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and the Docker OS
is alpine 3.7.3 for both SCONE version and Alpine version. All experiments use Intel
NUC7i5BNH with an i5-7260U processor with 4 cores at 2.20 GHz with 4 MB cache and 12
GB main memory.
4.3.2 Performance Overview
Selected modules and their description are listed below:
• core: It defines basic data structures, including the dense multi-dimensional array Mat
and many other basic functions which used by all other modules.
• calib3d: It includes basic multiple-view geometry algorithms, camera calibration and
stereo correspondence algorithms. It also contains the elements of 3D reconstruction.
• dnn: It is the deep neural networks module of OpenCV.
• features2d: It is used for feature detection and description, descriptor matching, draw-
ing function of keypoints and matches, and object categorization.
• objdetect: It is used to detect objects and instances of the predefined classes.
• stitching: It is used for rotation estimation, auto-calibration, image warping, seam
estimation, exposure compensation and image blenders.
Among these modules, the core module is the most important one, because it contains some
fundamental data structures and functions. Table 4.1 shows statistics of 39 over 127 unit







Unit Test SCONE/ms Alpine/ms Overhead
OCL UsageFlagsBoolFixture UsageFlags AllocHostMem 1119 1682 0.67
OCL CopyToFixture CopyToWithMaskUninit 4285 4057 1.06
Size MatType Mat Clone Roi 663 576 1.15
OCL SqrtFixture Sqrt 5539 4022 1.38
KMeans 81685 55992 1.46
OCL MinFixture Min 9557 6201 1.54
OCL RepeatFixture Repeat 5580 3322 1.68
OCL PolarToCartFixture PolarToCart 15945 9427 1.69
OCL BitwiseNotFixture Bitwise not 9669 5425 1.78
Size MatType Flag dct 134970 72429 1.86
OCL LogFixture Log 7276 3899 1.87
OCL InRangeFixture InRange 15345 8085 1.90
OCL ScaleAddFixture ScaleAdd 14598 7659 1.91
Size MatType bitwise or 2665 1336 1.99
Size MatType ROp reduceR 99518 49277 2.02
OCL MixChannelsFixture MixChannels 3500 1702 2.06
OCL PSNRFixture PSNR 1613 778 2.07
OCL NormFixture NormRel 11096 5198 2.13
Size MatType meanStdDev mask 5248 2290 2.29
Size MatType mean 5196 2216 2.34
Size MatType CmpType compareScalar 28549 12115 2.36
OCL CompareFixture CompareScalar 8184 3419 2.39
Size MatType Mat Transform 21528 8956 2.40
Size MatType bitwise and 3451 1427 2.42
OCL UMatTest CustomPtr 3319 1215 2.73
Size MatType max 4490 1639 2.74
Size MatType NormType norm mask 9608 3461 2.78
VectorLength phase64f 1649 573 2.88
OCL MeanStdDevFixture MeanStdDev 7939 2632 3.02
Size MatType NormType normalize 5299 1494 3.55
Size MatType minMaxLoc 6868 1805 3.80
Size MatType NormType norm2 6434 1637 3.93
Size MatType CvRound Float 2006 439 4.57
Size MatType NormType norm 2688 555 4.84
Size Mat StrType fs text 7883337 1438876 5.48
Size MatType sum 1042 169 6.17
PerfHamming norm 551 86 6.41
MatType Length dot 842 131 6.43
Size Mat StrType fs base64 2162298 257216 8.41
Table 4.1: Selected statistics of unit tests of core module
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Figure 4.2: Selected statistics of unit tests of core module
As we can see in Table 4.1, the overhead of OCL series of unit tests are generally smaller
than Size_MatType series of unit tests. The reason is because Size_MatType series unit tests
usually involves more complicated operations (e.g., matrix arithmetic) than OCL unit tests,
which can lead to even higher performance overhead in a SGX-enable environment.
Figure 4.2 shows some representative unit tests and their performance overhead. The lowest
overhead is even less than 1, which means SGX environment has even better performance.
However, this is the only case over 137 unit tests. Most performance overhead of unit
tests are less than three times, which is relatively acceptable, and the overall number of
2.94 just reflects this fact. There are still some unit tests involves some complex asth-
matics and have nearly intolerant performance. Some are five times, six times slower and
SIZE_MAT_STRTYPE_FS_BASE64 even shows the highest performance overhead at 8.41.
If we only have a look at the core module, the general overhead 2.94 is acceptable but not
satisfiable. However, other modules shows better performance. Figure 4.3 shows statistics of
other modules. The highest performance overhead is 1.40 in calib3d module and the lowest
overhead is only at 1.11 in objdetect module, which is actually a great number. The reason
why performance overhead of other modules is much lower than the core module is because
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other modules only involves small amount of complicated operations and these operations
are mostly resulted in using some data structures or functions from the core module.
Figure 4.3: Statistics of other selected modules
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we show that securing a unmodified real-world application such as OpenCV
and execute in a SGX environment is possible. The platform that we used is Secure Linux
Containers with Intel SGX (SCONE). We also evaluated the performance overhead of se-
lected OpenCV modules running in a SGX environment. We found the overhead of core
module is relatively higher at 2.94, while the overhead of other utility modules are ranged
from 1.11 to 1.40, which are small number.
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